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Abstract. Unsupervised projection approaches can support Intrusion Detection 
Systems for computer network security. The involved technologies assist a 
network manager in detecting anomalies and potential threats by an intuitive 
display of the progression of network traffic. Projection methods operate as 
smart compression tools and map raw, high-dimensional traffic data into 2-D or 
3-D spaces for subsequent graphical display. The paper compares three 
projection methods, namely, Cooperative Maximum Likelihood Hebbian 
Learning, Auto-Associative Back-Propagation networks and Principal 
Component Analysis. Empirical tests on anomalous situations related to the 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) confirm the validity of the 
projection-based approach. One of these anomalous situations (the SNMP 
community search) is faced by these projection models for the first time. This 
work also highlights the importance of the time-information dependence in the 
identification of anomalous situations in the case of the applied methods.  
Keywords: Unsupervised Learning, Projection Methods, Auto-Associative 
Back-Propagation, Computer Network Security, Intrusion Detection, 
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1  Introduction 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS’s) [1] monitor traffic in computer networks and 
take, or suggest, defensive actions when they detect suspect activities. IDS’s are 
common elements in modern infrastructures to enforce network policies. Today’s 
commercial systems typically rely on a knowledge base of rules to discriminate 
normal from malicious traffic. The set of rules, however, is susceptible to 
inconsistencies, and continuous updating is required to cover previously unseen attack 
patterns. 
Human beings seem to be able to learn without explicit supervision. One aim of 
unsupervised learning is to mimic this aspect of human learning and hence this type 
of learning tends to use more biologically plausible methods than those using error 
descent methods. Both projection and unsupervised methods [2], [3], [4], [5] can 
successfully apply to the visual based IDS’s technology. This paper analyzes some of 
those technologies, and compares the performances of two actual implementations of 
such paradigms: Cooperative Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning (CMLHL) [6] 
and Auto-Associative Back-Propagation (AABP) neural networks [7]. 
2  Visual Inspection of Traffic in Modern IDS’s  
A visual-based IDS could be organized as follows (Fig. 1):  
• packets traveling across the network are intercepted by a capture device;  
• traffic is coded by a set of features spanning a multidimensional vector space;  
• the compression component operates on feature vectors and yields a two or three-
dimensional representation of the network traffic;  
• the outcome of the projection component are presented to the network manager on 
















Fig. 1. A general schema of a visual-based Intrusion Detection System. 
The compression component processes an n-dimensional vector that has been 
previously assembled by a “packet processing” module, which extracts numerical 
features associated with each network packet. Hence, unlike other models which 
operate at the connection level [8], [9], the proposed IDS operates at the packet level. 
The design of the feature set is a crucial issue that has been thoroughly addressed in 
the literature [10]. It has been proved that timestamp, source and address port, and 
protocol uniquely identify a connection [11]. When dealing with Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) traffic, additional features may be required (e.g. to track 
connection state [12]); instead, User Datagram Protocol (UDP) traffic can be 
effectively characterized by a reduced feature set [4]. 
The compression component clearly is the core of the overall IDS, and is designed 
to yield an effective representation of network traffic. Its overall function is to support 
the network supervisor at detecting traffic anomalies. A connectionist approach seems 
to best fit the anomaly-detection problem mainly because it allows a system to learn 
empirically the input-output relationship between raw traffic data and its subsequent 
interpretation. Indeed, the outlier-detection method does not require any a-priori 
analytical formulation of the underlying phenomenon. Section 3 illustrates two 
different projection approaches to the dimensionality reduction mapping task of 
traffic data. 
3  Nonlinear Projection Methods for Dimensionality Reduction 
3.1 Neural Implementation of Exploratory Projection Pursuit 
The classical statistical method of Exploratory Projection Pursuit (EPP) [3] provides a 
linear projection of a data set onto a set of basis vectors which best reveal the 
interesting structure in data; interestingness is usually defined in terms of how far the 
distribution is from the Gaussian distribution. Maximum Likelihood Hebbian 
Learning (MLHL) [13] is a neural implementation of EPP: it identifies interestingness 
by maximising the probability of the residuals under specific probability density 
functions which are non-Gaussian. 
The Cooperative Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning (CMLHL) model [6] 
extends the MLHL paradigm by adding lateral connections [6], which have been 
derived from the Rectified Gaussian Distribution [14]. The resultant net can find the 
independent factors of a data set but does so in a way that captures some type of 
global ordering in the data set. Considering a D-dimensional input vector (x), and a 
Q-dimensional output vector (y), with Wij being the weight (linking input j to output 
i), then CMLHL can be expressed [6] as:  
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Where: η is the learning rate, τ is the “strength” of the lateral connections, b is a 
bias parameter, p a parameter related to the energy function [6] and A a symmetric 
matrix used to modify the response to the data [6]. The effect of this matrix is based 
on the relation between the distances separating the output neurons. 
3.2 Auto-Associative Back-Propagation Networks 
An Auto-Associative Back-Propagation (AABP) network involves a Multi-Layer 
Peceptron (MLP) structure [15] which typically includes at least one “hidden” layer. 
It associates an input vector, x∈ℜD, with an output vector, y∈ℜQ, computed as: 
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where, Nh is the depth of the sigmoid series expansion, and W represents the 
coefficients of the weights for the interconnections between the two upper layers. 
Empirical fitting drives the weights, W, so that the network best reproduces (in an 
Euclidean sense) the desired (x, y ≡ x) mapping over a given training set.  
Auto-associativity in the AABP model stems from imposing the output target equal 
to the input stimulus, hence y ≡ x and Q = D; compression instead results from 
imposing that Nh < D.  The overall goal of this unsupervised approach is a reduction 
in dimensionality by forcing the network to replicate the training sample distribution. 
At run-time, an AABP network associates each input vector with the ”coding” values 
computed by the hidden neurons. Since the hidden layer is typically smaller than the 
input/output ones, these mapping outputs support the (lossy) transformation from the 
input space into a lower-dimensional representation. A three-layer AABP network 
implements a mapping that is, in fact, affine to linear Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA).   
Non-Linear Principal Component Analysis (NLPCA) [7] was designed to 
circumvent the limitations of linearity inherent in the PCA model (Fig. 2). The output 
layer still imposes the auto-associative constraint y ≡ x, and a hidden layer supports 
dimensionality reduction. Both the compression and reconstruction sections, however, 
include an additional layer of neurons, thus yielding a five-layer network. At run-time 
after completion of training, the mapping outputs of the middle “coding” layer 
provide the low-dimensional representation of each input vector. The increase in 
power of representation conveyed by the NLPCA augmentation is remarkable. 
Typically, the ”reconstruction” section and the compression section will always be 
symmetrical and will therefore always yield equivalent, universal (inverse) mapping 
capabilities. 
 
Fig. 2. The Non-Linear AABP network. 
The main advantage is that the compressed representation does not relate to any 
linear model but stems from a mostly general representation that is learned 
empirically. NLPCA techniques fit those domains in which 1) a non-linear 
representation best encompasses the observed empirical phenomenon, and at the same 
time, 2) a considerable number of empirical samples are available. 
4 Using Projection Methods for Visual Based IDS’s 
In principle, any unsupervised method applies to the involved representation process; 
Self-Organizing Maps [1] and Vector Quantization-based methods [5] have had a 
considerable success in supporting IDS’s technology. As compared with those 
models, projection based approaches offer the crucial advantage of combining 
compression ability and the support for graphical, intuitive representation. The 
following sections discuss the performance of the CMLHL model and the AABP 
model in the monitoring and detection of anomalous events in a real scenario. 
4.1 Identification of SNMP Community Search  
For simplicity and without loss of generality, the present IDS is targeted to detect 
traffic anomalies within the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), which is 
a part of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol suite. 
SNMP is an application layer protocol that supports the exchange of management 
information between network devices. This protocol enables network administrators 
to manage network performance and is used to control network elements such as 
routers, bridges and switches. This property makes SNMP data quite sensitive and 
liable to potential attacks. Indeed, an attack based on the SNMP may severely 
compromise system security, as reported by CISCO [16].  
In order to test the above mentioned models under the IDS’s field, this research 
addresses some different types of attacks relying on the SNMP:  
• SNMP port sweep: a port scan (or sweep) is an attempt to count the services 
running on a machine (or a set of machines) by probing each port for a response. 
• SNMP community search: the community string can be seen as the SNMP 
password for versions 1 and 2. The intruder sends SNMP queries to try and 
determine the SNMP community string. 
• MIB information transfer: the Management Information Base (MIB) collects 
information on each managed device, including sensitive data such as network and 
router information (e.g. IP and MAC addresses and VLan configuration). As 
specified by the Internet Activities Board, the SNMP is used to access MIB 
objects; thus, protecting a network from malicious MIB information transfer is 
crucial.  
Two different data sets have been used in the present work: 
− Data set 1 (utilized in [4]): it contains three consecutive sweeps on some machines. 
Port numbers 161, 162 and 3750 have been probed for SNMP. This is followed by 
an MIB information transfer (for a known or default community name). 
− Data set 2: it differs from the previous one in that the attacker probes for 3 different 
community names on 3 different ports. That is, 3 different hosts try to check 3 
different community strings (“public”, “private” and “aab”) for SNMP on ports 
161, 1161 and 2161 at the same time. This attack is set between the port sweeps 
and the MIB transfer. After trying to find whether and where (hosts and port 
numbers) SNMP is running, the community string is requested in order to access 
the information contained in the MIB. When the community string has been found, 
the MIB information is read. It is worth highlighting that the projection models 
face the SNMP community search (included in this data set) for the first time. 
Both data sets contained network packets related to normal and anomalous 
situations. They were captured from UDP traffic, as SNMP uses UDP as the transport 
protocol. Hence, the data sets included only packets that use UDP as transport layer, 
IP as network layer and some protocols (SNMP among them) as application layer. 
4.2 Feature Extraction 
The eventual network-based IDS for the detection of SNMP anomalous traffic is 
structured as shown in Fig. 1. The “packet processing” component generates feature 
vectors by working out information contained in the packet header. In the present 
research, network packets are characterized by using the set of features that already 
proved to be effective for detection of anomalous SNMP traffic [4]. The set of five 
features that are extracted from packets contribute to build up the neural-network 
input vector, x∈ℜ5. These features can be listed as follows: protocol ID (the protocol 
of the packet), source port (the port number of the device that sent the packet), 
destination port (the port number of the host to which the packet was sent), size 
(packet size in Bytes) and time (the time when the packet was sent). 
As such, at the output of the “packet processing” module the network traffic is 
mapped in a five-dimensional feature space. According to the set-up discussed in 
Section 2, the compression module exploits the projection method (either CMLHL or 
AABP) to generate a two-dimensional representation of the network traffic by starting 
from the original five-dimensional space. Thus, first an offline training phase uses 
empirical data to set the configuration of weight quantities for the neural network. 
Then, the eventual neural system is used to process the feature vectors generated at 
run-time and to feed the visual display. 
4.3 Identifying Different Anomalous Situations 
The following experimental verification shows the performance of three projection 
models (linear PCA, CMLHL and AABP) to analyse their response to the data sets 
described above. In these experiments, the configuration of the AABP network 
included a number of 30 nodes in the hidden layers (coding and reconstruction), while 
of course the number of neurons in the middle layer was Nh=2. 
As can be seen in Fig. 3.a, the CMLHL projections manage to identify all the 
anomalous situations contained in Data set 2. The three sweeps (Group A) and the 
community search (Group B) are identified due to their non-parallel direction to the 
normal one. The MIB information transfer (Groups C and D) is identified due to its 
orthogonal direction with respect to the normal traffic (vertical and parallel straight 
lines) and to the high density of packets. Linear PCA projection was tested on the 
same data for comparison (Fig. 3.b). PCA could identify the port sweeps (Group A) 
and the community search (Group B), but failed at detecting the MIB information 
transfer: in the graph the MIB packets (Groups C and D) evolve in a direction parallel 
to the “normal” one. 
 
Fig. 3.a tridimensional CMLHL projection Fig. 3.b tridimensional PCA projection 
Fig. 3. Experimental verification of the projection methods for Data set 2: a) 3-D CMLHL 





It can be seen in Fig. 4.a how CMLHL is able to identify the anomalous situations 
(Groups A, B and C) included in Data set 1 as it has been explained before. This 
outcome shows the intrinsic robustness of CMLHL, which is able to properly respond 
to a complex data set that includes time as a variable. In the case of AABP, this issue 
is not clear at all when using the time as one of the input variables. Including a linear 
growing variable (time) forced the two inner neurons to learn a linear path, which is 
reflected in Fig. 4.b. 
  
Fig. 4.a bidimensional CMLHL projection Fig. 4.b bidimensional AABP projection 
Fig. 4. Bidimensional projections for Data set 1 (including time in the input variables): a) 
CMLHL projection; b) AABP projection. 
The comparative approach supports the view that projection methods are an 
interesting and powerful tool in the identification of anomalous situations. This study 
shows for the first time how the CMLHL is capable of identifying the anomalous 
situation related to an SNMP community search. Another interesting issue is the 
capability of CMLHL to process time information as one of the data variables. In 
contrast, the AABP network can not deal with the time variable, even though it 








can be extended by the application of multiagent systems in an architecture akin to the 
MObile VIsualization Connectionist Agent-Based IDS (MOVICAB-IDS) [18]. 
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